My paper published in Seminar, India
THE hallmark of Pakistan’s political elites is their narrow base. A limited number of families have dominated Pakistan’s legislatures since the country’s inception in 1947.¹ These families traditionally are from rural landowning and tribal backgrounds. The situation in the twenty first century remains largely unchanged. Indeed, the principal change may be the expansion of dynastic politics to include families from urban, religious and military backgrounds.
The politics of kinship networks in Pakistan, as in South Asia more generally, is firmly anchored in the politics of clientelism,² which in turn is closely related to caste, ethnicity and identity.³ Clan, tribe, caste and biradari⁴ play a major role in electoral contests and in defining populist politics. These ties also legitimize the political family’s hold on resources and the passing on of these resources as legacy to new generations of family members.

This essay proposes a typology of dynasties in Pakistan, beginning from the ‘traditional’ rural dynasty of the Bhuttos, going on to the urban dynasty of the Sharifs, and concluding with the newer dynasties with religious and military backgrounds. Along the way, it shows how these dynasties are rooted in the politics of patrimonialism and clientelism. (more…)

“South Punjab, in particular, the districts of Multan and Bahawalpur…, have a vast range of cultural assets. the living culture of the communities carries influences of the inherited ancient civilizations and historical past which flourished in this region and has permeated their present day culture and its expressions. Cultural zones within these two districts are discernable which have infused the living culture of communities influencing their lifestyle, value system and world view; giving the South Punjab region a distinct cultural identity reinforced through their shared language, Saraiki. the earliest, dating back to 3800 BCE, is that of the Cholistan desert, the Rohi made famous by the region’s premier Sufi Saint Khawaja Ghulam Fareed. Although the built assets are contained within the desert yet its intangible expressions of poetry and oral narratives, song and dance is embedded
within the culture of the region, in particular Bahawalpur. The influences of the material culture of the ancient people of the Hakra Valley Civilization can still be found in the pottery making traditions and in the motifs and designs which continue to be used. The other identifiable culture ethos permeating the living culture of the region is that engendered by the advent of the Sufi saints in the 10th century onwards.  The Sufi philosophical and material culture emanated from the ancient cities of Multan and Uch Sharif, the central abode of mystical Islam in the region, which had far reaching impact on the whole of South Punjab and further into Sind and Northern India.  the erstwhile Bahawalpur State (1802-1955 CE) has also had deep influence on the culture of the district and the built form engendered during the State period has left an indelible mark on the built environment of the
entire area, most prominent in its capital city, Bahawalpur and the twin capital Dera Nawab Sahib….”
Read the full report by UNESCO here:  http://unesco.org.pk/culture/documents/publications/Cultural_Expressions.pdf

By Raza Rumi

Published today by Jinnah Institute, Islamabad:

Notwithstanding the contradictions inherent to pre-1947 Muslim politics, Jinnah was clear about certain fundamentals. Pakistan was to be a secular, democratic state. It was not destined to be a national-security obsessed and a paranoid military-intelligence complex.
Pakistan was to be a federation and Jinnah’s advocacy in the 1930s and 1940s was majorly focused on achieving a de-centralized governance paradigm. Finally, the new state was envisioned as a peaceful country, which would interact and establish relations with its neighbour India following the US-Canada model. Jinnah indicated that he would not mind settling down in his native city Bombay after his retirement. All of these facts are on public record and not fantastic or imagined tenets of his vision. What was so alarming about Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan that had to be virtually undone by the custodians of a Praetorian state? Not unlike Pakistan’s history, Jinnah’s legacy is a contested and fractured narrative.

After successive victories, the right wing of Pakistan won a significant battle under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) when it officially established the “ideology of Pakistan”. However this victory was not limited to official pronouncements but significant institutional changes were also effected to achieve a colonial archetype from South Asian history i.e. a “permanent settlement” of ideological contours. Lord Cornwallis may have undertaken such a settlement for Bengal’s fertile land but Pakistan’s education system, the media and the public discourse finally declared such a settlement as the sacred “truth”.

This sacred “truth” nullified Jinnah’s vision and historic struggles to achieve a fair deal for the Muslims of India, which had culminated in the creation of a truncated and “moth-eaten” Pakistan.

In terms of domestic governance of the new polity, Jinnah’s speeches to civil servants, firm advice to military officers and even to some of his errant politician colleagues were clear. The bureaucracy and the Army had to operate within the legal boundaries and a new direction for the post-colonial state had to be negotiated without undermining the rule of law and the imperative of creating a citizen-responsive state. To the military men Jinnah said the following in June 1948:“…I should like you to study the constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its true constitutional and legal implications.” And, to the civil service, (more…)

Without civil service reform, devolution of policy setting will be unachievable and the current reform may just not achieve its intended purposes

On July 1, 2011, the third phase of redistribution of federal powers and functions was completed whereby 7 federal ministries now stand devolved. These include Ministries of Health, Food and Agriculture, Labour and Manpower, Environment, Women Development, Sports and Minorities affairs. Earlier, ten ministries were devolved to the provinces with the abolition of concurrent list under the 18th Amendment.

Implementing the 18th Amendment: The process has been fraught with political bickering between the Centre and the Provinces and resistance by powerful groups, which are beneficiaries of a centralised Pakistan. However, these political and administrative contests have not undermined the process of devolution. A major factor in negotiating this transition has been the role of Mian Raza Rabbani who heads the Implementation Commission for the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

Most significantly, the political parties have shown their willingness to work together in achieving the intended results of provincial autonomy related clauses. Having said that, the real test of the elected civilian governments has just begun. Large scale restructuring of the federal government and transfer of new functions to the provinces implies that there is much more needed than executive notifications and political rhetoric.

Beyond executive notifications: Four challenges are of urgent importance. First, to ensure that devolution process is completed and not truncated or manipulated to suit the ends of the political parties. At the same time the regulatory capacity of the state, already weakened over decades, must not be diluted during the transition. Secondly, the corresponding institutional capacities are also devolved to the provinces and where missing, the Centre should advise and facilitate institutional strengthening. Thirdly, a civil service reform is required to achieve the responsive and citizen-oriented governance — the larger goal of the 18th Amendment. Finally, decentralisation of provincial powers is also needed and the local government system should be reintroduced. Unpacking and addressing these four imperatives is now an urgent responsibility, which the federal and provincial governments cannot absolve themselves of. (more…)

Rarely have countries been so incapable of responding to challenges, as is the case with Pakistan. Last year, the worst flood in our historyhit millions of poor Pakistanis, wiping away their livelihoods and depriving them of their dwellings and, in many cases, land entitlement. It was due to the resilience of the Pakistani people thatsome post-flood rehabilitation took place. Like much else in the country, people took their lives into their own hands and the state, at best, was a secondary player. Media focus remained on the politicisation of the response to the natural disaster and making heroes out of army battalions which, at least on paper, are subordinate to the elected executive.

What has happened since then? I was intrigued to note an advert a month ago in the national newspapers wherein a multilateral agency was hiring a programme manager for ‘early recovery’ after floods! Multilaterals reflect the speed and bureaucratic labyrinths of the government and, therefore, this little notice seemed farcical at best. Forget early recovery, we are now back in the monsoon season. And the federal and provincial governments appear to be as ill-equippedas before.

I was part of a team that undertook post-flood assessment and had a chance to interact with key stakeholders last year. The attitudes of some high level public officials are a subject of a satirical book rather than this short piece. In summary, their assumption was that the poor were resilient and knew how to deal with disasters and that life goes on. Several of the recommendations that we offered remain unimplemented, chiefly those relating to local governments. (more…)

It is too early to determine whether Nawaz Sharif is seeking a structural transformation of Pakistan’s governance culture or is merely hankering for acceptability within the power matrix.

By Raza Rumi:

Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance is now embedded in the very nature of the Pakistani state and the way it works. The “idea” of Pakistan has evolved into a wide-ranging and somewhat irreversible militarisation that has penetrated into the society, economy and the very imagination of Pakistan. Prima facie, there is a Constitution at work with civilian institutions that come and go as side characters on the grand political theatre of Pakistan.

However, as they say, societies are dynamic entities and evolve over time. Since the 1971 defeat of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, the trajectory of military supremacy was quite consistent. It is a separate matter that the 1971 moment arrived amid a complete information blackout in the western wing of the country. The West Pakistani newspapers were reporting victory, until the inglorious surrender of General Tikka Khan at today’s Ramna Park in Dhaka on December 16th 1971. Interestingly, the headline printed by daily Dawn on December 17th was: “War till victory”. A small news item below this vain headline read, “Fighting ends in east wing”. The 1970s witnessed the revival of a demoralised and defeated army by none other than populist and pro-poor Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Ideology of militarism: It was Mr. Bhutto who provided the grand ‘ideological’ narrative for the next four decades. Whereas he mobilised people for rights and seeking voice in the manner Pakistan was to be governed, he reinvented the framework for a martial state. First, fighting with India for a thousand years and regaining Kashmir became the plank of state policy. Second, the active pursuit of nuclear prowess became the overarching objective of the security doctrine positioned in relation to the enemy, i.e., India. (more…)

My interview which has appeared on Wikileaks Central.

Pak-Usa

The Dawn Media Group in partnership with WikiLeaks has been releasing the “Pakistan Papers.” Thus far, some of the revelations include the following: US was concerned that Pakistan would oppose its policies at the United Nations; US was worried Pakistan would purchase oil from Iran, allowing them to get a foothold in Pakistan; Pakistan’s government was upset with US funding for the Pakistan military, which led to increased civil-military tensions; Pakistan’s military asked for continued drone coverage; the US has had troops deployed on Pakistan soil; Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been financing jihadist groups in Pakistan and the US did not provide Benazir Bhutto with proper security. (more…)

My piece for The News, Pakistan

As details of Operation Geronimo unfold, more and more questions are being raised regarding Pakistan’s role in the war on terror. Sadly, millions of Pakistanis are even more confused than the global pundits. Other than the lunatic fringe thriving in the folds of mainstream media, ordinary Pakistanis are dumbfounded at the prospect of the world’s most wanted man living next to the deep state’s power-house, i.e., the Pakistan military academy. If bin Laden was indeed residing in a purpose-built house with extra thick walls and security cameras then how come Pakistan’s most ‘efficient’ institution was unaware of this lethal presence? Furthermore, if they were not involved in the operation then how could a mammoth defence establishment allow such a clandestine operation by a foreign country which violated air space and international laws?

Governance crisis: Some of these questions will be answered in due course and some will perhaps turn into eternal conundrums. Perhaps, the most pressing issue then remains, who governs Pakistan and in what manner? Seemingly a constitutional republic, Pakistan’s representative and relatively accountable institutions surely do not steer the ‘national security’ policies. The latter have their own limitations and imperatives of rent-seeking but they are marginal to core policies. Here is the fundamental disconnect and reasons for the flourishing non-transparent culture. (more…)

The dramatic events of May 2, enacted in Pakistan’s small, sleepy town of Abbottabad have surely shaken the world. The global icon of al Qaeda — Osama bin Laden — has been ‘eliminated’ through a well-executed, covert operation. This was a major victory for charismatic US president Barack Obama especially given his dwindling popularity, and will help him survive in office, perhaps, for another term. It isunlikely that this development will lead to the end of global terrorism. While his death may have symbolic value, Osama was not in any case in charge of al Qaeda operations and hence the impact may not be much.

The most significant aspect of this game-changing event, perhaps, is the cutting of all ties between al Qaeda and sections of our security establishment. While Pakistan’s assistance in executing the operation against bin Laden’s hideout is being downplayed for political reasons, it should be obvious that all this couldn’t have happened without its active help. For all its front line status, the Pakistani state has not yet permitted the Americans to operate in the ‘settled’ areas, the way unmanned drones work in Fata. The recent hullabaloo over the strained Pakistan-America relationship has once again proved to be exaggerated: Stories were spun for domestic political consumption in both countries. (more…)

The impediments to full provincial autonomy under the 18th Amendment need to be tackled despite the odds

By Raza Rumi

Perhaps the best thing about contemporary Pakistan is the way its governance arrangements are being restructured to undo the bitter, brutal legacy of centralisation. Had we undertaken such reform decades ago, Pakistan would have been a far better place. The 18th Amendment reflects a board political consensus on how Pakistan can actually evolve into a real federal state as opposed to the notional federalism of the past where provincial autonomy had become a residue of central patronage and not guaranteed by the Constitution.

Nevertheless, the devolution of powers in 2011 faces two major dilemmas. First, the provinces are currently operating as centralised bureaucratic apparatuses with little or no powers and accountabilities at the local levels. Second, and perhaps far more important, the provinces have to build their technical and political capacities to handle the new powers and functions, which are now flowing at an unprecedented speed. These two challenges are the real test of civilian governments and it remains to be seen if they can handle it lest another messiah or messiah-proxies enter the arena and reverse this process. Knowing Pakistan’s history, anything is possible. This is a country plagued by lack of political stability and policy continuity. We shall examine the pitfalls and challenges that lie ahead in this transitional process.

Progress so far: During the first two phases of the devolution, 10 of the 48 ministries at the federal level were to be devolved. The Committee set June 30th 2011 as the deadline for this process. Taking up these recommendations, the federal cabinet devolved ministries for special initiatives, Zakat and Ushr, population welfare, youth affairs, and local government and rural development to the provinces in December 2010. The provinces also inherited office buildings, equipment, development funds and projects for fiscal year 2010-11. All international matters of these ministries were transferred to the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) and some planning-related matters to the Planning and Development Division. However, overall planning of ministries that are being transferred or will be transferred in February 2011 will be the responsibility of provincial governments.

On April 5th, 2011 the second phase of the devolution process commenced, with the devolution of the ministries for education, social welfare, and special education, tourism, livestock and dairy, rural development and culture. According to reports, the Commission for Implementation of the 18th Amendment has also approved a plan for the transfer of three federal ministries, including sports, women development and environment, to the provinces in the third phase.

Unclear federal arrangements: While the centre has abolished ten ministries so far, there is a deadlock over the staff and resources. Provinces complain that they cannot pay the wage bill of surplus staff and centre has retained all the existing federal public servants, as any move to right size will be fraught with political dangers. Similarly, after June 2011, who will pay the staff? If the federal government continues to foot the salaries bill then it will not be able to rationalise its size and the temptation of recentralisation will remain. Secondly, the federal government’s move to shift attached bodies and autonomous organisations to Cabinet Division and such other dysfunctional ministries is even worse. There needs to be a more thorough assessment of post-devolution architecture of the central authority. It appears, with due respects to a great reformer, Raza Rabbani and his colleagues, patchy, ad-hoc and devoid of long term thinking. (more…)

By Raza Rumi

There must be something terribly wrong with the state of Pakistan that in its largest province, state schools no longer recite the national anthem and are giving up on the Pakistani flag. Tragic, that such alarming reports flashed in the national newspapers and on the internet are a subject of little debate and introspection across the country. Either that nobody really cares as to what happens to the tribals in the southwest of Pakistan, or that there is soft censorship at play. Such is the level of self-censorship on the issue of Balochistan that the ongoing insurgency finds scant mention in the otherwise, hysterical electronic media of Pakistan. True, there are brave exceptions in the public arena, but the eerie silence on Balochistan is disturbing for any Pakistani who believes in the territorial and federal integrity of Pakistan.

Only during the last six months, dozens of Baloch political activists have been reported dead. It is difficult to ascertain exact numbers, given the lack of credible information. But palpable violence defines the state of Balochistan. On the one hand, there are Baloch activists, leaders and professionals who are being targeted by ‘unknown’ forces and on the other hand, thousands of ‘settlers’ (mostly Punjabis) have been leaving the province, as their lives are no longer secure. A wide array of Baloch separatist groups exist in the province, whose source of funding is unknown and whose political agenda is vague, despite the overall banner of ‘independence’. (more…)

Huma Imitiaz has summed up the session I moderated at the KLF. Huma has been kind to me but I am just a humble student of literature and facing Intizar Saheb in this session would remain a milestone in my imagined literary journeys, yet to start…

“There are two forces that have risen in Pakistan: women and mullahs,” said writer and journalist extraordinaire Intizar Husain, at the Karachi Literature Festival. The crowd roared in approval, and Husain smiled. At his session, held on the second day, the room was nowhere near full capacity, but those in attendance were hanging on to his every word. In a one on one discussion with writer Raza Rumi, Husain talked about a variety of subjects, from writing techniques to the Lahore that once was.
(more…)

By Raza Rumi

Honour politics: More often than not, we as Pakistanis feel that we are not given the respect we deserve as a sovereign nation, and that we are not taken seriously by the international community. We feel unfairly lumped together, with a few bad apples marring our national character through their involvement in terrorism, illegal immigration, and other grave misdemeanours, whereas the vast majority of Pakistanis are peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Now, we have before us an opportunity to prove those who would judge us by our green passport dead wrong, and do the right thing, despite popular protests being whipped up for political gain.

Did US Diplomat Raymond Davis commit cold-blooded murder of two innocent, cellphone-and-gun-loving boys, or was it self-defense against blatant dacoity? The answer is worth investigating but not all that relevant. Davis ostensibly carries a Diplomatic Passport (as stated by our Interior Minister), and he was allowed to travel to Pakistan by our own Foreign Ministry. As galling as it might be to some quarters, we will have to let him go, not because we want to aid and abet murder, but rather, by respecting the long-established principle of diplomatic immunity, we show our strength and stability to the world, and show the international community that we are not a “rogue” or “terrorist” state, but rather one which respects international standards, conventions and agreements. (more…)

As Pakistan enters into another year fraught with fresh challenges and old dilemmas, it is quite clear that its ruling elites – civil and military – are unwilling to learn from history. The crisis of governance in the country has spiraled out of control. We are heading towards grave internal conflict, the possibility of which has been bolstered by serious economic woes in the wake of high inflationary trends. Most importantly, the dilemma of reconciling our national security interest with a possible long-term economic agenda is becoming even more problematic by the day.

Radicalistan? Pakistan’s radicalization is now a threat to its society and the region. Whilst General Zia ul Haq will be remembered for institutionalizing extremism, most Pakistani governments, including democratic and quasi-democratic regimes have in the past, surrendered to the Islamist fringe. From Liaquat Ali Khan’s acquiescence to a terribly vague and confusing Objectives Resolution to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s unforgivable act of declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims through a constitutional amendment, Pakistan’s long-term interest has always been sacrificed at the altar of short-term expediency and political survival. But the Pakistan of today is not a case of a majority beholden to a virulent minority; it is split from within and fraying at the edges.

Extremism has become embedded in our social fabric?: we are a country in transition. The old is cracking up and the new remains undefined and directionless. Over 65 percent of Pakistan’s exploding population is under the age of 26 and the coming generations will set the future course of the country. However, the portents are disheartening. Nearly 60 percent of youth surveyed in a countrywide poll (organized by British Council Pakistan) had little faith in democracy. Therefore, the glorification of former Governor Punjab Salmaan Taseer Shaheed’s murderer is not an isolated incident. It reflects a combination of societal changes in the broader context of religo-political transformation. At least three factors have greatly contributed to these phenomena.

First, the education system and its overtly pro-jihad bias (whether in madrassas or in state-run schools), has led to the construction of a particular mindset that shuns reason in favor of a theological or a hyper-nationalist discourse. Second, the institutionalization of mullahs and mosques with hefty state patronage backed by the zakat distribution systems ensure that public discourse is controlled and aligned with national security imperatives. Third, the sheer neglect of a social change agenda and absolute disregard for issues of social justice and a citizen voice means that there is an ever-increasing citizenship crisis. A large number of Pakistanis either enjoy partial citizenship rights (Balochistan, many parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and even Karachi for that matter) or none at all (Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir to name a few). (more…)