‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’ is not dead
In recent weeks, several commentators have dwelt upon the amorphous notion of ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’, challenging its notional contours and exposing its overt ideological underpinnings. Whilst such a debate is healthy in a democratic society, it becomes a worrying sign in a deeply polarised polity such as Pakistan. Jinnah’s Pakistan was no consensus project: It had several dissenters — from the religious right to the Khudai Khidmatgars in the northwest. Perhaps these problematic foundations led to the capture of the state by a national security paradigm, later bolstered by the Islamist discourse.
Blaming Jinnah’s Pakistan as a cause or manifestation of the ideological chaos rooted in our perennial identity question is simply disingenuous. Jinnah may have said different things at different occasions but his views as head of the state are what matter. It was not Jinnah alone who created Pakistan. The politico-economic interests of nascent ‘Muslim’ bourgeoisie and the famous salariat (to use Hamza Alavi’s term) were the prime causes of Pakistan’s creation. Jinnah nearly gave up the idea of a separate state in 1946 after accepting the Cabinet Mission proposals (the best possible compromise to retain Indian unity). Many critiques of Jinnah overlook the ‘intransigence’ of the Indian National Congress, documented by HM Seervai. Sadly, both India and Pakistan have buried the fairly objective view of Seervai, as particularistic nation state narratives are always threatened by objectivity.
In spite of the horrors unleashed by Partition, Jinnah insisted on a US-Canada type relationship between India and Pakistan with, open and permeable borders; and even wanted to retire in his beloved city, Bombay. However, he died too early and Gandhi, while fasting for the rights of Pakistanis, was killed by an Hindu extremist (note the absence of this fact in the Indian discourse — Hindutva terror started with Gandhi’s assassination).
India was soon taken over by its political-bureaucratic machinery and Pakistan’s security forces took direct control of power. Such appropriation of Pakistani political space could only work if theIndian ‘threat’ was amplified to alarming proportions. Consequently, the entire country became a fortress, defending itself from reason, with ‘religion’ painted on its entrance. Did Jinnah envisage or wish such a polity? No, he warned against it.
Jinnah had a sense of Indian unity above the newly formed states of ‘Pakistan and Hindustan’. American scholar William Metz noted in his 1952 doctoral thesis (University of Pennsylvania), that for Jinnah, a Hindu-Muslim settlement was itself a form of Hindu-Muslim unity.
Recounting history is important today. The religious zealots who are silencing voices of tolerance did not believe in Jinnah’s Pakistan. They wanted a pan-Islamic theocracy — what al Qaeda wants Pakistan to become in 2011. Pakistan is a reality but its viability is once again linked to Jinnah’s post-June 1947 vision entailing: a) a secular state, b) resistance to calls for theocracy, and c) a US-Canada model for India-Pakistan relations.
Jinnah’s Pakistan is not dead: Millions of Pakistanis who want a tolerant homeland resent its creeping radicalisation. If not Jinnah, what else do we have to counter the armed extremism on the Pakistani street? If we have drifted too far, which we have, then all the more reason to reclaim the ideal. Denouncing Jinnah’s vision, ironically, reinforces the national security paradigm as well as the Indian nationalist narratives. I hope Pakistani ‘liberals’ are aware of that.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 21st, 2011.
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a. Jinnah had said that minus the three central subjects the CMP was Pakistan. It was commonly understood that the CMP merely delayed Pakistan by 10 years. So I don’t follow “Jinnah nearly gave up the idea of a separate state in 1946″.
b. “The politico-economic interests of nascent ‘Muslim’ bourgeoisie and the famous salariat (to use Hamza Alavi’s term) were the prime causes of Pakistan’s creation.” and of course, the reference to Seervai – “the INC caused Pakistan to be created” — poor Jinnah, the hapless passenger on a boat tossed by the waves of history.
Of course, it is entirely possible, isn’t it, that Seervai’s thesis is simply wrong and that is why it is ignored?
c. “note the absence of this fact in the Indian discourse — Hindutva terror started with Gandhi’s assassination” – it seems to me you know nothing of the Indian discourse. Gandhi’s assassination is a central feature of the anti-Hindutva discourse in India.
d. “Jinnah insisted on a US-Canada type relationship between India and Pakistan” – yes, you know in regard to what Mr J said he’d call the whole thing off. So I guess you mean a relationship like the War of 1812.
e. “Such appropriation of Pakistani political space could only work if the Indian ‘threat’ was amplified to alarming proportions” — No. For the longest of time, people like Ejaz Haider and Ayaz Amir and such were quite happy to be part of the English-speaking elite of Pakistan untouched by all this, and quite happy to say that the policy of pushing jihadis into India and into Afghanistan and into Uighuristan, and into Chechnya and so on was quite justifiable, no skin off their ass. Only now that the jihadis are consuming Pakistan too is there alarm in the English-speaking class.
f. Which should give a clue that the argument over Jinnah’s vision is mostly innocuous – it falls within the limits of normal, mostly sane, unviolent political debate. It is the long tolerance of all the various Lashkars and Jaishs and so on – about which there has been no debate at all – I challenge you to find articles in the Pakistani press asking whether this is wise; whether there might be blowback – the Afghans did tell Reagan that supporting mujahideen against the Soviets was unwise; Pakistanis never did – this unchallenged cornerstone of Pakistani policy that is at the root of the violent politics of Pakistan today.
[...] 'Jinnah's Pakistan' is not dead [...]
What Pakistan needs today is sovereignty. This is the single most issue for any nation. Lack of sovereignty is what fuels majority of these stupid debates between the left and the right, it creates the left and the right in the first place.
The right believes the govt has sold out to America and is fighting against that.
The left believes the right has taken over and is fighting against..
Do you see what we have become? All we do is take a stand against each other, but we actually stand for nothing.
There is tremendous amount of anger in people today. I am quite shocked by it..and it is on both sides.
After Taseer’s assassination, I saw these angry claiming victory on blogs/facebook. They believe their religion, nation, their prophet were at risk and they fought for it.
All they are happy about is they killed one of ‘them’. They dont even realize what they stand for.
What Pakistan needs is a strong, sovereign government, that has neither sold out to America, nor taken over by radicals. These radicals did not just fall from the sky one day. Pakistan is the nation that saw and celebrated Nazia Hassan singing Pop songs in the 1980s, much before India had any female pop singers.
Its only when a nation loses its independence, sovereignty, people become polarised and take sides..and all that remains after a while is sides – the left vs the right, the radicals vs the secularists, the liberals vs the conservatives. No one knows what they stand for.
More on Jinnah, please.
[...] Rumi ‘Jinnah’s Pakistan’ is not dead 2 days [...]
hmm….I like what Faraaz said…simple yet straight forward…
All Pakistan need is sovereignty….
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