Jahane Rumi In search of the unsearchable: O, my soul! where would you find your house?

The question of Pakistan’s provincialism

My piece that appeared in the 'political economy' section of The NEWS on Sunday.

The elites drunk on the status quo have expressed two major reactions to the proposal of creating another province within the mighty Punjab. First that this is akin to opening a Pandora's box when we are at war against terrorism. Second, that this is a planted controversy whereby the ruling PPP wants to harm the house of Raiwind; or a conspiracy by those who want to destabilise Pakistan's political system.

Both these arguments are spurious for nothing is more important for Pakistan than to make the federation work. The argument that the British drawn provincial boundaries are sacrosanct is as nonsensical as the reality of the Durand Line or for that matter the line of control itself. If anything, South Asia has experienced territorial and demographic shifts through the centuries. When resisted, the sweep of history has blown away the resistant elements and when carefully manoeuvred such shifts have resulted in commonsensical political and administrative solutions.

Before we explore this question of Pakistan's provincialism, let us understand what was happening in the neighbouring state that dealt with the thorny issues of linguistic, ethnic identities and attempted to administer a disparate country like India. Since the 1950s new states have been carved out from the older states, through a constitutional process. Hence, we see the division of Eastern Punjab into Punjab, Haryana, and Himachal Pradesh. As late as 2000, Uttra Khand emerged as a new state out of the unwieldy and ungovernable Uttar Pradesh. Chhattisgarh was separated from Madhya Pradesh in 2000 and Jharkhand; the 28th state of India was created in the year 2000, when the Bihar reorganisation bill was passed. This is an ongoing dynamic process where more governable and less disharmonious units emerge and continue to emerge from the old order created by Mughal empire and the British colonial state.

On the other hand, we, the fortress of Islam, appeared on the globe as a lopsided federation in 1947 where the majority province was separated from the minority provinces by one thousand miles of "hostile territory" and where all sorts of manipulation continued to neutralise the majority province and deny it the rightful share in state services, power and resources until the situation became untenable. The first Pakistani cabinet had a single minister from the majority province and the trend continued unabated through the 1950s and the 1960s. A parity between the two sides i.e. West Pakistan and East Pakistan was engineered to ensure that the West Pakistan, otherwise a minority wing, would get a higher share in governance while the Eastern wing with the numerical majority would forego some of its rightful claims. The one unit arrangement was a legal articulation of this culture of dominance that West Pakistan wanted to maintain in the larger national interest that was based on the imperative of national security.

As if this was not enough, a West Pakistani military dictator ruled for a decade in a centralised, almost a unitary form of government whitewashing the realities of power with hollow rhetoric of federalism. What could be expected of this fractured state of the union?

It is, therefore, not surprising that Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman came up with the contentious six points in 1970 that led to his branding as a traitor and an Indian agent. The West Pakistani elites are on record to have agreed to most of these points except the one pertaining to separate currencies. But an untenable federation further ruined by a brutal crushing of a movement for regional autonomy resulted in the destruction of Jinnah's Pakistan in 1971.

The new Pakistan, which by all accounts can be termed as Bhutto's Pakistan, ironically, turned into the haunting dilemma of managing yet another lopsided federation. The three smaller units could not match the numerical strength nor the resources or access to state power that Punjab enjoyed. Even Bhutto had to crush provincial movements in Balochistan and NWFP through military means. The alienation of the smaller provinces was aggravated further under Zia ul Haq who treated Sindh like an old Raj colonist by murdering its brightest man and crushing popular movements that centred on the fables of Bhuttoism.

The 1973 Constitution was an attempted solution to create a legal framework for a workable federation. However, its key provisions relating to the management of federal relations such as the Council of Common Interests were rarely invoked let alone implemented. Punjab's due share of federal resources became a point of resentment and the use of natural resources from Balochistan, a rallying point for anti-federal politics. The overrepresentation of the Punjab in the armed forces and bureaucracy has not helped the situation either. In effect we have rather miraculously survived the time bomb of an untenable federation largely through the construction of a "national enemy" in the form of our eastern neighbour, which, sadly, played a direct role in the disintegration of Jinnah's Pakistan.

During our recent version of martial rule, under General Musharraf, the story has remained familiar. The Baloch leaders have been mercilessly killed, the Pakhtuns are aggrieved due to the imposition of a foreign war on their soil and the Sindhis continue to remain disenchanted after their second federal leader was murdered in broad daylight near a 'Punjabi' cantonment. The long due reform of Pakistan's federal politics is an urgent need. What is the harm in having a full-fledged debate in the parliament on this critically important issue. Is challenging the largest province's inherited hegemony a conspiracy, sin or yet another foreign intervention? About time we recognised the reality of our existence and shun the meta-narratives crafted by state sponsored histories and the insidious textbook one-nation theory.

Pakistan cannot become as a nation unless its ethnic, linguistic, religious and geographical groups are at peace with each other and perceive the federal system as a fair system of co-existence. How else are we going to tackle the growth to anti-federal forces such as the Balochistan Liberation Army, among others?

In fact why the division of Punjab alone should be a topic of national debate? Equally important is to look at the other three units and the way demographics have changed in the last three decades. Balochistan is not anymore the sole preserve of the Baloch people. It has a sizeable number of Pakhtuns and other groups living in it. The urban and rural Sindh divide is well-known. The Pakhtuns and Hazara communities in NWFP are distinct. All of these issues need to be taken up by a designated, special purpose parliamentary committee.

The power distance of the citizenry is now an alarming trend in Pakistan. The state and its agencies are remote, inaccessible and, often, indifferent. This has eroded public trust in state as an arbiter of public interest. Mammoth provincial bureaucracies rule far flung areas from their comfortable and highly centralised offices. This has to change if we have to survive and prosper as a viable country. Any further erosion of state writ spells doom for Pakistanis and, perhaps, the regions as well. The non-state actors have gained ground and entrenched themselves as armed mafias vying for spoils of the post-colonial state.

Is it not a matter of common sense that we redress some of these issues through a process of democratic debate, compromise and settlement than wait for another messiah to come and sketch new boundaries from a barricaded Islamabad?

Critics have also raised the issue that further sub-division of existing provinces would multiply the administrative expenses and lead to the creation of more battalions of cabinets, advisors and bureaucrats. This is pure and simple hogwash for not a simple and rough calculation has ever been made. The inertia of Pakistani policy makers and their adhocism prevents them from even a basic exercise of preparing and costing such policy options. All one hears on the ubiquitous TV shows is hot air, fallacies and partisan pretensions. Even the intelligentsia has not paid much attention to details of this kind for they are as factionalised as the Pakistani federation itself.

Even if it means swallowing a bit of text book pride, we ought to learn from India where except for certain states such as Kashmir and the troubled north-east, federalism has been negotiated and rationalised by its ruling political elites. General Musharraf had promised devolution of powers from the centre to the provinces, which was never implemented. The centre remains as strong as ever but like a termite-infested structure its decay is also a reality. The provincial centres of power are well-entrenched in exercising control and doling out patronage but their ability to govern has also dwindled. It is said that al-Qaeda is safely operating in Balochistan and the insurgents are scot free in the remote areas away from the provincial capital. The mythical Punjab's southern belt is now considered as catchment area for militant Islam that supplies suicide bombers at reasonable rates. There are pockets of the Punjab province that are poorer than Sindh and Balochistan.

Let us not even talk about NWFP for its anarchy is a tragedy of our times. And, we need not recount the horrors of abject poverty and deprivation in the Tharparkar or the urban mafias who are the proxy state in the province.

This is a time to act. There is no room for further procrastination in tackling the ailments of the federal system. The media instead of playing partisan politics with reporters and self-styled commentators being agents of partisan agendas should allow the flourishing of an open debate. Even better, let us have credible opinion polls on this issue. Independent social scientists and legal experts must come forward with the range of options that are feasible for the country. Above all, the political elites mired in thana kutchehri and development schemes must recognise their historical role at a juncture when Pakistan is facing threats from within. Let us hope they can prove Mirza Ghalib wrong who had uttered years ago: "hooay tum dost jis kay, dushman us ka aasman kyon ho."

The author is a development professional and a writer based in Lahore. He blogs at www.razarumi.com and edits Pak Tea House and Lahorenama e-zines. Email: razarumi@gmail.com